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NOTES
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER ACTS OF
TERRORISM COMMITTED ABROAD: OMNIBUS
DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AND
ANTITERRORISM ACT OF 1986
In response to increased public concern over the rising inci-
dence and violence of terrorism against American citizens abroad,'
Congress enacted the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterror-
ism Act of 1986.2 The Act expands the United States' extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction3 to foreign nationals4 involved in international
terrorism that injures United States citizens. The statute bases juris-
diction on the passive personality principle 5 and the universal the-
ory6 rather than concepts of territoriality or nationality. This
approach represents a significant departure from prior assertions of
federal criminal jurisdiction. 7
The Act has precedent in international law, and does not tran-
scend Congress's constitutional authority to define and punish ter-
rorism. Concededly, the United States government has traditionally
rejected assertions of jurisdiction not based on territoriality or na-
tionality. This Note argues, however, that the executive and judicial
1 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1986, at 1, col. 4 (discussing rise in terrorism in latter
part of 1985 as well as recent proposals to prevent terrorist attacks).
2 Pub. L. No. 99-399, § 1202, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (100 Stat.)
853, 896-97 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2331) [hereinafter "the Act"].
3 Commentators find it difficult to define "jurisdiction." Courts invoke the term in
a variety of contexts, "some relating to geography, some to governmental and judicial
structure, some to legislative or judicial power, and some to persons and procedures."
George, Extraterritorial Application of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH. L. REV. 609, 609 (1966).
In the international setting, the term "jurisdiction" refers to the competence of a state
to prosecute and punish. The Draft Convention on Research in International Law of the
Harvard Law School,Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 467 (Supp.
1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research]. Under United States law, jurisdiction encom-
passes a variety of different concepts, most notably subject matter and personal jurisdic-
tion. This Note uses jurisdiction in two senses: jurisdiction to prescribe rules for
regulating human conduct, and jurisdiction to enforce those rules. Paust, FederalJurisdic-
tion over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International
Law Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA.J. INT'L L. 191, 201 n.39 (1983).
4 "A 'national' of a State is a natural person upon whom that State has conferred
its nationality, or ajuristic person upon whom that State has conferred its national char-
acter, in conformity with international law." Harvard Research, supra note 3, at 473.
5 See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
6 See infra text accompanying note 18.
7 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1-6005 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (codification of crimes and
criminal procedure in federal law).
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branches' objections to the Act lack validity because the Act's nar-
row scope will not abrogate existing jurisdictional lines. This Note
first examines the current theoretical bases for asserting jurisdiction
under international law, and reviews the traditional American repu-
diation of any assertion of jurisdiction not based on territoriality or
nationality. It next surveys the Act and analyzes the constitutional
source of the Act's authority. Next, the Note examines the theoreti-
cal problems with asserting jurisdiction over terrorists under the
universal theory. It concludes that the passive personality principle
provides the Act with a sounder theoretical foundation, and argues
that the United States' historic hostility to that principle is unpersua-
sive in assessing the Act's desirability. Finally, the Note proposes
that the United States assert a more limited degree of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction than the Act mandates. The suggested approach is
sufficiently flexible to deter terrorism, yet more sensitive than the
Act to important international prudential concerns.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Jurisdiction and International Law
"International law" is a difficult concept to understand fully. It
does not comfortably fit within the modern lawyer's system of
codifications and precedent." This difficulty arises because
"[i]nternational law is, in one sense, merely a summary of what gov-
ernments claim as their rights or recognize as the rights of others." 9
International law evolves out of the need for expedient solutions to
problems arising between nations.' 0 Its development derives from
the growing awareness that a nation's existence and relations de-
pend upon predictable and ascertainable rules of law. I
These rules spring from two distinct sources: customary and
conventional international law. Customary international law arises
out of common understandings among nations which gradually
crystallize into rules of conduct. 12 Conventional international law
consists of treaties, scholars' statements, and decisions of interna-
tional and domestic tribunals.' 3
8 SeeJessup, The Reality of International Law, 18 FOREIGN AFF. 244 (1940) (discussing
uncertainty and broad scope of international law).
9 F. DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS 21 (1932).
10 1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1, at 1 (1940).
11 Id.
12 Id. For example, "universal jurisdiction to punish genocide is widely accepted as
a principle of customary law." RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 404 reporters' note 1 (Tent. Final Draft 1985) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT DRAFT].
13 1 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 10, at 1.
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An influential 1935 article' 4 suggested that five bases exist for
jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes: territorial, protective, na-
tionality, universal, and passive personality. Under the territorial
theory a state may assert jurisdiction with respect to any crime com-
mitted wholly or partly within its territory. This jurisdiction extends
to any legal entity which, while outside a state's territory, commits
or attempts to commit any crime within its realm.' 5 Under the pro-
tective theory a state may assert jurisdiction over an alien for any
crime committed outside its territory impinging upon the security,
territorial integrity, or political independence of the state.' 6 Under
the nationality theory a state may assert jurisdiction over any crime
committed outside its territory by a national of that state. 17 The
universal theory labels certain crimes so heinous that any nation ob-
taining control over the suspect may assert jurisdiction regardless of
the accused's nexus to the forum.18 The passive personality princi-
ple permits a state to assert jurisdiction over the accused solely be-
cause the offense harmed a national of the state claiming
jurisdiction. 19 States and scholars have since accepted these theo-
ries as defensible grounds for asserting jurisdiction. 20  The Act
14 Harvard Research, supra note 3.
15 Id. at 480.
16 Id. at 543.
17 Id. at 519.
18 Id. at 573; see infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
19 Harvard Research, supra note 3, at 573-77.
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7) is the most famous
case dealing with the passive personality principle. In Lotus, Turkey prosecuted and con-
victed a French merchant seaman, of the French vessel Lotus, for manslaughter. The
Lotus had collided with the Turkish ship Boz-Kourt in international water, causing the
loss of eight Turkish lives. France objected to the prosecution on the ground that Tur-
key had no adequate basis forjurisdiction under any principle of international law. Both
France and Turkey submitted the dispute to the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice at the Hague for resolution of the jurisdictional issue. Id. at 10-12.
France argued that international law prohibited Turkey from asserting jurisdiction
based on the victim's nationality. Id. at 6-7. The court ultimately held that Turkey's
assertion ofjurisdiction was valid because the Boz-Kourt was a ship bearing the flag of
Turkey and thus Turkish territory. Id. at 26. Although the court based its finding of
jurisdiction on other grounds, the court expressly reserved its opinion of whether a state
may take, by reason of the victim's nationality, jurisdiction over an offense committed by
foreigners abroad. Id. at 22-23.
Although the decision is equivocal, it is nonetheless significant that the majority,
unlike the six dissenting justices, did not expressly repudiate the passive personality
principle, thus leaving the door open for acceptance of the principle at a later date. The
majority seemed to view jurisdiction with respect to crime as a malleable doctrine, not
limited to ideas of territoriality. It viewed crime as a social evil which all states have an
interest in suppressing and as a developing idea only limited to the enlightened free will
of nations. Id. at 18-19.
20 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 10-19 (1965); J. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 553
(1971); FellerJurisdiction over Offenses with a Foreign Element, in 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 5 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973); Shachor-Landau, Extra-
19871
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stemmed from a debate on the two most controversial of these con-
cepts, the universal theory and the passive personality principle.2 1
Universal jurisdiction first requires that states recognize a crime
as worthy of special treatment.22 Normally, international agree-
ments and resolutions of international organizations reflect the
world community's interest in suppressing these crimes. 23 For ex-
ample, a tentative draft to the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States lists piracy, slave trading, attacks on or
hijacking of aircraft, genocide, and war crimes as offenses falling
within the United States' universal jurisdiction.24 The brevity of the
preceding list illustrates the difficulty inherent in forging an interna-
tional consensus on the despicability of any particular act.
Western nations have contested the passive personality princi-
ple more vehemently than any other theory ofjurisdiction. All An-
glo-American nations traditionally oppose the concept 25 and urge
that jurisdiction remain primarily territorial. They assert that any
notion of jurisdiction other than territoriality or nationality threat-
ens to abrogate all existing jurisdictional lines.26 A growing number
of influential countries, however, expressly accept the passive per-
territorial Penal Jurisdiction and Extradition, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 274, 282-85 (1980);
Sarkar, The Proper Law of Crime in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 50
(G. Mueller & E. Wise eds. 1965); see also cases cited infra notes 95 & 99. For an alterna-
tive classification system, see Perkins, The Territorial Principle in Criminal Law, 22 HASTINGS
L.J. 1155 (1971).
21 See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING FOUR
DRAFTS OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO ATTACK THE PRESSING AND URGENT PROBLEM OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, H.R. Doc. No. 211, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1984) (proposed
legislation "utilizes the well accepted territorial, personal, and passive personality bases
for the exercise of legislative jurisdiction under international law").
22 Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial
Crimes, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 685, 717.
23 The United States currently has a number of treaty obligations that define and
punish specific acts such as air hijacking. Id. at 717 n.104. The United States and six
Latin American nations have adopted the Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of
Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that Are
of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413. This
agreement, however, is the only one to which the United States is a party and that at-
tempts significantly to deal with the terrorist threat.
24 RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 12, § 404; see also Blakesley, supra note 22, at
717-19.
25 See Harvard Research, supra note 3, at 579. The British objections to jurisdiction
under the principle are mentioned in D. DE VABRES, LES PRINCIPES MODERNES Du DROIT
PENAL INTERNATIONAL 107 (1928).
26 2J.B. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 200-202 (1906); cf. The Apollon
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824) (emphasizing that municipal laws of one nation do not
extend beyond that territory); State v. Grady, 34 Conn. 118 (1867) (courts of Connecti-
cut take no cognizance of offenses committed in another state); Johns v. State, 19 Ind.
421 (1862) (Indiana can only punish defendants who are within state); State v. Stephens,
118 Me. 237, 107 A. 296 (1919) (courts of Maine have no jurisdiction over offenses of
bigamy committed outside state).
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sonality principle. 27 Apparently these nations believe that a state
should prosecute terrorists for crimes against its citizens when the
nation with primary responsibility for such prosecution has failed to
do so.
B. The History of the Passive Personality Principle and
Universal Theory in United States Law
In the past the United States has reacted inflexibly to the pas-
sive personality principle and the universal theory. It has consist-
ently opposed foreign governments' attempts to assert jurisdiction
based on the passive personality theory28 and has accepted only lim-
ited applications of the universal theory. 29
Beginning in the early nineteenth century, the United States ac-
cepted application of the universal theory to the crime of piracy.3 0
In 1958, article 19 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas ex-
plicitly provided for the prosecution of pirates wherever found.3'
Several other crimes-slave trade,32 war crimes, 33 hijacking of civil
aircraft, 34 and genocide 3 5-have received similar treatment, but lack
27 See, e.g., C.P. art. 10; SWEDEN PENAL CODE, ch. 2, § 3(3) (G. Mueller ed., T. Sellin
trans. 1972). For a look at the nations which adopted this principle as of 1935, see
Harvard Research, supra note 3, at 578-79.
Since 1975, the French Code of Criminal Procedure has permitted jurisdiction over
extraterritorial offenses committed against French nationals: "Any foreigner who, be-
yond the territory of the Republic, is guilty of a crime either as author or accomplice,
may be prosecuted and convicted in accordance with the disposition of French law,
when the victim of the crime is a French national." C. PR. PEN. art. 689, para. 1 (Dalloz
1975).
28 Blakesley, supra note 22, at 715 ("The passive personality theory ofjurisdiction is
generally considered to be anathematic to United States law.").
29 Id. at 715-17.
30 See 2 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 10, § 203, at 681 ("It has long been recognized
and well settled that persons and vessels engaged in piratical operations on the high seas
are entitled to the protection of no nation and may be punished by any nation that may
apprehend or capture them.").
31 Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 19, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2317,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, at 6, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 92. The article provides:
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any
State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship taken by
piracy and under control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the
property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure
may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine
the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, sub-
ject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.
32 Id. art. 13, 13 U.S.T. at 2316, T.I.A.S. No. 5200 at 5, 450 U.N.T.S. at 90.
33 See generally In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (offenses clause of Constitution
empowers Congress to prosecute war criminals although all acts occurred outside of
United States territory).
34 Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage),
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 (convention pro-
vides for punishment of aircraft hijackers wherever they are found).
35 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
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of consensus over a controlling definition of terrorism has pre-
vented international agreements on that subject.3 6 Thus, whether
the universal theory embraces terrorism remains unanswered. 37
Unlike the universal theory, the United States has never ac-
cepted any application of the passive personality principle. Cutting's
Case38 illustrates the United States' position. In Cutting a Mexican
court convicted an American citizen of libel based upon a newspa-
per article printed in Texas. The court asserted jurisdiction under a
Mexican statute providing that "[p]enal offenses committed in a for-
eign country by a Mexican against Mexicans or foreigners, or by a
foreigner against Mexicans, may be punished in the Republic." 39 The
aggrieved party was a Mexican national, and the accused American
had periodically lived in Mexico for several months. Although a
Mexican appellate court later ordered the American's release after
the victim withdrew his complaint, 40 the controversy elicited some
strong words from the United States' executive branch.
In a letter to the United States charg6 in Mexico, the Secretary
of State made it clear that the United States did not recognize the
jurisdiction of any nation over persons accused of offenses wholly
committed and consummated within the territory of another sover-
eign state.41 The Secretary charged that no customary principle of
U.N.T.S. 277. Although the United States was instrumental in drafting this treaty, the
United States Senate has yet to ratify it.
36 Blakesley, supra note 22, at 719 (Terrorism has "not yet achieved sufficient inten-
sity of interest to warrant recognition as [a] true bas[i]s for universal jurisdiction ... .
37 See RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 12, § 404 comment a.
38 1887 PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES [FOR.
REL.] 751, reprinted in 2J.B. MOORE, supra note 26, § 201, at 232.
39 C.P.D.F. art. 168, reprinted in 1887 FOR. REL. at 856 (emphasis added), reprinted in
2 J.B. MOORE, supra note 26, § 201, at 230-31.
40 See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, REPORT ON EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIME AND THE CUT-
TING CASE 17 (J.B. Moore ed. 1887), reprinted in 1887 FOR. REL. 757, 767.
41 1887 FOR. REL. 751, reprinted in 2J.B. MOORE, supra note 26, § 201, at 232. Secre-
tary of State Baynard wrote that "the assumption of the Mexican tribunal, under the law
of Mexico, to punish a citizen of the United States for an offense wholly committed and
consummated in his own country against its laws was an invasion of the independence of
this Government." Id. at 752, reprinted in 2J.B. MOORE, supra note 26, § 201, at 234. He
noted, "As to the question of international law, I am unable to discover any principle
upon which the assumption of jurisdiction made in Article 186 of the Mexican penal
code can bejustified." Id. at 753, reprinted in 2J.B. MOORE, supra note 26, § 201, at 236.
He then observed,
It has constantly been laid down in the United States as a rule of
action, that citizens of the United States can not be held answerable in
foreign countries for offenses which were wholly committed and consum-
mated either in their own country or in other countries not subject to the
jurisdiction of the punishing state.
Id. at 755, reprinted in 2J.B. MOORE, supra note 26, § 201, at 237. He concluded,
To say that he may be tried in another country for his offense, simply
because its object happens to be a citizen of that country, would be to
assert that foreigners coming to the United States bring hither the penal
[Vol. 72:599604
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international law justified the Mexican statute.42 In his annual ad-
dress to Congress, President Grover Cleveland commented on the
Mexican question. He reiterated the Secretary's objection and ad-
ded that jurisdiction based on the passive personality principle
would destroy the certainty essential to the law ofjurisdiction. This
result would undermine the United States' territorial integrity. 43
The Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States reflects this traditional hostility toward the passive personality
principle: "A state does not have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of
law attaching legal consequences to conduct of an alien outside its
territory merely on the ground that the conduct affects one of its
nationals." 44 Furthermore, many commentators consider the pas-
laws of the country from which they come, and thus subject citizens of the
United States in their own country to an indefinite criminal responsibility.
Id., reprinted in 2J.B. MOORE, supra note 26, § 201, at 238.
42 Id. at 753, reprinted in 2 J.B. MOORE, supra note 26, § 201, at 236.
43 President Cleveland stated:
A sovereign has jurisdiction of offenses which take effect within his
territory, although concocted or commenced outside of it; but the right is
denied of any foreign sovereign to punish a citizen of the United States
for an offense consummated on our soil in violation of our laws, even
though the offense be against a subject or citizen of such sovereign. The
Mexican statute in question makes the claim broadly, and the principle, if
conceded, would create a dual responsibility in the citizen, and lead to
inextricable confusion, destructive of that certainty in the law which is an
essential of liberty.
1886 FOR. REL. viii, reprinted in 2J.B. MOORE, supra note 26, § 201, at 231-32.
The Mexican reply to President Cleveland countered with the proposition that
[t]he right which every nation has to impose national conditions
upon entry of foreigners upon its own territory conveys with it the right
within the limits of legislation to hold such foreigners responsible for acts
they may commit abroad against that nation or, against any of its citizens
or subjects.
1888 FOR. REL. at 1114.
44 § 30(2) (1965). This position seems to have changed in recent tentative drafts.
RESTATEMENT DRAFr, supra note 12, §§ 401-404 (Tent. Final Draft 1985 & Tent. Draft
No. 7, 1986). Professor Blakesley suggests that although § 402 of the Draft is equivocal
as to whether it accepts or rejects the passive personality principle, he believes that the
principle appears acceptable when § 402 is read in conjunction with comment (g), which
states:
The status in international law of the so-called "passive personality"
principle has been in considerable controversy. States have sometimes
invoked such a principle to justify application of their law-particularly
criminal law-to acts committed outside their territory by persons not
their nationals, on the basis that the victims of the acts were their nation-
als. While the principle has not been generally accepted for ordinary
torts or crimes, it has been increasingly accepted when applied to terror-
ist and other organized attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their
nationality ....
RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 12, § 402 comment g. Concluding, Professor Blakesley
states that given the wide support for the principle, it would be difficult to say interna-
tional law precludes its application. See Blakesley, supra note 22, at 716 n.99.
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sive personality principle as against United States law45 because
principles of nationality and territoriality generally have governed
its exercises of jurisdiction. Finally, a federal court of appeals deci-
sion expresses the view that Congress may not employ the passive
personality principle in a jurisdictional statute.46 The Act thus rep-
resents a significant departure from the United States' traditional
rejection of the passive personality principle. 47 It attempts to recon-
cile the United States' traditional distaste for the passive personality
principle with the reality of terrorism.
II
CONGRESSIONAL EXPANSION OF UNITED STATES
JURISDICTION TO REACH ACTS OF TERRORISM
COMMITTED ABROAD
A. The Act
On July 11, 1985, Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania intro-
duced a bill that would expand United States jurisdiction to include
terrorists who attack American nationals abroad.48 This bill formed
the nucleus of the Act that President Ronald Reagan signed into law
on September 1, 1986.49 The amendment to title 18 of the United
States Code grants United States courts jurisdiction to prosecute
any foreign national who, in an act of international terrorism,50 at-
tempts to kill, kills, assaults, or makes any violent attack upon any
American national.5 1 It provides for the prosecution of any terrorist
found within the territorial limits of the United States regardless of
45 See, e.g., id. at 716.
46 United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1979) (defendant sus-
pected of receiving stolen vehicle in foreign commerce not within court's jurisdiction
because Congress only recognizes protective and objective territorial theories of
jurisdiction).
47 See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 40, at 56-69, reprinted in 1887 FOR. REL. at
793-802.
48 S. 1429, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
49 Statement on Signing H.R. 4151 into Law, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1124
(Aug. 27, 1986).
50 See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
51 Section 1202 of the Act provides:
(a) HOMICIDE. - Whoever kills a national of the United States, while
such national is outside the United States, shall -
(1) if the killing is a murder as defined in section 1111 (a) of this
title, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or for
life, or both so fined and so imprisoned;
(2) if the killing is a voluntary manslaughter as defined in section
1112(a) of this title, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both; and
(3) if the killing is an involuntary manslaughter as defined in sec-
tion 1112(a) of this title, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than three years, or both.
(b) ATTEMPT OR CONSPIRACY WTrH RESPECT TO HOMICIDE. - Who-
[Vol. 72:599606
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the situs of his offense. 52 For jurisdiction, the Act only requires that
the accused has committed an act of international terrorism against
an American. 53
The original Senate proposal54 defined terrorism by reference
to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.55 That statute defines
international terrorism as a violation of the criminal laws of the
United States or any foreign nation that appears intended to intimi-
date or coerce the population, to influence the policy of the govern-
ment, or to affect the conduct of the government.56 Although the
ever outside the United States attempts to kill, or engages in a conspiracy
to kill, a national of the United States shall -
(1) in the case of an attempt to commit a killing that is a murder
as defined in this chapter, be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 20 years, or both; and
(2) in the case of a conspiracy by two or more persons to commit
a killing that is a murder as defined in section 1111 (a) of this title, if one
or more of such persons do any overt act to effect the object of the con-
spiracy, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or
for life, or both so fined and so imprisoned.
(c) OTHER CONDUCT. - Whoever outside the United States engages
in physical violence -
(1) with intent to cause serious bodily injury to a national of the
United States; or
(2) with the result that serious bodily injury is caused to a na-
tional of the United States;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned more than five years, or both.
Pub. L. No. 99-399, § 1202, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (100 Stat.) 853, 896-
97 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2331).
52 This conclusion follows from the text of the statute. Amended subsections (b)
and (c) both begin "[w]hoever outside the United States" and then list a series of of-
fenses falling within the respective subsection. This language continues the emphasis
that began in the earliest drafts of the Act. The statute in its earliest form had made it
crystal clear that the bill contains no territorial limits. See S. 1429, § 2(a), 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1985) ("(d) The United States may exercise jurisdiction over the alleged of-
fense if the alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the place
where the offense was committed or the nationality of the victim or the alleged
offender.").
53 See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
54 S. 1429, § 2(a), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) ("(c) For the purposes of this sec-
tion, 'international terrorism' is used as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, title 50, section 1801(c).").
55 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801 (West Supp. 1987) (empowering President to order elec-
tronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information).
56 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(c) (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis added) provides:
(c) "International terrorism" means activities that -
(1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that
would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the
United States or any State;
(2) appear to be intended -
(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimida-
tion or coercion; or
(C) to affect the conduct of a government by assassina-
tion or kidnapping; and
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Act no longer defines terrorism by reference to the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act, it adopts an almost identical definition. As a
condition to prosecution under the Act, the Attorney General, or his
subordinate, must certify that "such offense was intended to coerce,
intimidate, or retaliate against a government or a civilian
population." 57
B. Constitutional Authority for the Act
Article I, section 8, clause 10 of the Constitution authorizes the
Act's expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, even if the statute vi-
olates customary international law.58 The Constitution provides
Congress with the power to "define and punish Piracies and Felo-
nies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of
Nations." 5 9 This provision contains at least two separate and dis-
tinct congressional powers-prescriptive jurisdiction and enforce-
ment jurisdiction. 60  Prescriptive jurisdiction applies to the
(3) occur totally outside the United States, or transcend national
boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the
persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in
which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
Finding a suitable definition for terrorism is a quagmire which is beyond the scope
of this Note. No widespread agreement exists among nations as to the definition of
"international terrorism." See Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism
Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that Are of Interna-
tional Significance, Oct. 8, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413; see also H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1986) [hereinafter CONF. REP.] (urging President
to call for international negotiations to formulate definition of terrorism), reprinted in
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1925, 1959.
57 Section 1202 of the Act provides in relevant part:
(e) LIMITATION ON PROSECtrrIoN. - No prosecution for any offense
described in this section shall be undertaken by the United States except
on written certification of the Attorney General or the highest ranking
subordinate of the Attorney General with responsibility for criminal pros-
ecutions that, in the judgment of the certifying official, such offense was
intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a government or a ci-
vilian population.
Pub. L. No. 99-399, § 1202, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 853, 897
(to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2331(e)).
The Act's legislative history clearly demonstrates that Congress intended that the
certification by the Attorney General, or his subordinate, should not be subject to judi-
cial review. The same legislative history, however, emphatically states that the purpose
of the Attorney General's certification is to ensure that the Act is not applied to normal
street crime or barroom brawls. CONF. REP., supra note 57, at 87-88, reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1960-6 1. Thus, Congress paradoxically intended to
limit the scope of the statute while removing the mechanism to carry out that intent.
58 The Act, however, is within the bounds of customary international law. See supra
note 27 and accompanying text.
59 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 ("offenses clause").
60 Comment, The Offenses Clause: Congress' International Penal Power, 8 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 279 (1969). That the offenses clause envisioned both prescriptive and
enforcement jurisdiction is more obvious from an early draft of the provision. The
Committee of Detail indicated a desire to express the provision in two separate clauses.
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activities, relations, or status of persons.6 1 Enforcement jurisdiction
authorizes a government to use its resources to induce or compel
compliance with its laws. 62
Statutes and case law interpreting the offenses clause are mea-
ger, especially if they are separated from enactments and decisions
arising from Congress's related power to define and punish piracies
and felonies.63 Because Congress rarely indicates the constitutional
authority for a particular jurisdictional statute, isolating the provi-
sions which rely on the offenses clause is difficult. Similarly, courts
have avoided deciding questions under the offenses clause by
resorting to more widely recognized powers. 64
In the early nineteenth century, Justice Story broadly inter-
preted the offenses power:
As the United States are responsible to foreign governments for
all violations of the law of nations, and as the welfare of the Union
is essentially connected with the conduct of our citizens in regard
to foreign nations, [C]ongress ought to possess the power to de-
fine and punish all such offences, which may interrupt our inter-
course and harmony with, and our duties to them.65
Justice Story's reasoning suggests that universally accepted vio-
lations of international law are not the only crimes within the
clause's scope. A constitutional basis for imposing criminal liability
exists if an individual's behavior affects American foreign policy or
violates Congress's perception of international norms. 66 The of-
fenses clause thus extends jurisdiction beyond the limits allowed by
customary international law.
This position is supported in Ex parte Quiin, 67 one of the few
cases directly dealing with the offenses clause. In Quiin a military
tribunal prosecuted, under the Articles of War,68 German saboteurs
This draft would have empowered the legislative branch to "provide tribunals and pun-
ishment for mere offenses against the law of nations [and t]o declare the law of piracy,
felonies and captures on the high seas, and captures on land." 4 M. FARRAND, THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 44 (1937).
61 RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 12, § 402.
62 Id.
63 Comment, supra note 60, at 293 ("This scarcity is explained primarily by the fact
that the entire volume of American law concerning foreign relations is relatively modest
and by the fact that Congress derives overlapping authority in this area from the foreign
commerce and implied foreign affairs powers.").
64 Id. ("[W]hen tribunals have faced close questions under the Offences [sic]
Clause, they have been able to avoid the issue by resorting to other more ample
powers.").
65 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrrUON OF THE UNITED STATES 57-58
(1833) (emphasis added).
66 Comment, supra note 60, at 291.
67 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
68 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(9) (1982).
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who landed on the shores of Long Island and Florida in 1942. The
Articles, contrary to customary international law, 69 permit the mili-
tary to prosecute prisoners of war.70 The captured soldiers peti-
tioned the Court for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming an
unconstitutional prosecution by the military court and the denial of
a jury trial. The Court, invoking the offenses clause, denied the
writ. Chief Justice Stone wrote that Congress may incorporate cus-
tomary international law by reference but need not undertake "to
codify that branch of international law or to mark its precise bound-
aries, or to enumerate or define by statute all the acts which the law
condemns." ' 71 Quirin thereby reiterated Justice Story's suggestion
that Congress has broad discretion in defining and punishing of-
fenses against the law of nations, a discretion unencumbered by in-
ternational law norms.
The decision in United States v. Rodriguez 72 also supports Justice
Story's analysis. In Rodriguez the court, utilizing the protective the-
ory of jurisdiction,73 found the statute prohibiting visa forging ap-
plicable to acts committed outside of United States territory by
virtue of the offenses clause.74 The court wrote that where there is
"a crime against the sovereignty of the state, the very existence of
the state provides authority to Congress to prohibit its commis-
sion," 75 and emphasized that "Congress may pick and choose
whatever recognized principle of international jurisdiction is neces-
sary to accomplish [its legislative] purpose ... without waiting for
action to be taken by foreign governments which would grant the
United States the right to exercise jurisdiction." 76 The court rea-
soned that prior disuse or even misuse of the federal government's
power to incorporate a principle of international jurisdiction into a
statute is not a basis for finding that Congress cannot employ this
power.77
69 Quiin, 317 U.S. at 29 ("We may assume that there are acts regarded in other
countries, or by some writers on international law,... which would not be triable by
military tribunal here .... ").
70 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(9) (1982); see also Quirin, 317 U.S. at 41 (no need for excep-
tion from fifth and sixth amendments "to continue the practice of trying, before military
tribunals without a jury, offenses committed by enemy belligerents against the law of
war").
71 317 U.S. at 29.
72 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960), aff'd in part sub nom. Rocha v. United States,
288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961).
73 See supra text accompanying note 16.
74 182 F. Supp. at 494.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 491.
77 Id.; see also United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 216 (N.D. Cal.) ("The fact
that Congress in the past may have favored or disfavored any particular ground for as-
serting extra-territorial jurisdiction is irrelevant to the consideration of Congress's con-
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In United States v. Smith78 the First Circuit stated that the of-
fenses clause gives Congress the power to authorize assertions of
jurisdiction based on any of the internationally recognized princi-
ples. The court held that Congress intended a statute prohibiting
drug possession on the high seas to apply to acts committed outside
United States territory on non-United States vessels. 79 The court
upheld the assertion of jurisdiction under an objective territorial
principle, which "has been defined as including acts done outside a
geographic jurisdiction, but which produce detrimental effects
within it."80 Although this type of jurisdiction is unconventional,
the court held that the constitution permits Congress to authorize
the assertion ofjurisdiction under such a theory.
The Rodriguez and Smith courts thus accepted Justice Story's
conclusion that Congress's authority to proscribe crimes committed
outside the United States extends beyond the limits of the American
judicial tradition.81 Congress may define and punish offenses in in-
ternational law, notwithstanding a lack of consensus as to the nature
of the crime in the Unites States or in the world community.
III
THE EXPANSION OF EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION Is
JUSTIFIABLE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF
EXISTING UNITED STATES AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Even though Congress has constitutional authority to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Act will only gain acceptance in the
world community if it has a legitimate basis in international law.
The Act finds such support from the universal theory and the pas-
sive personality principle. 82
stitutional power to assert that jurisdiction."), appeal dismissed, 645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 973 (1981).
78 680 F.2d 255 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983).
79 680 F.2d at 258.
80 Id.
81 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text; see also Rivard v. United States, 375
F.2d 882, 886 (5th Cir.) (although not all nations have accepted objective territorial
theory of jurisdiction, court adopted it to permit prosecution of alien drug smugglers
who acted solely outside United States where co-conspirators had acted within United
States territory), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967).
82 See supra text accompanying notes 18-19 (defining these bases). None of the
other three jurisdictional theories, see supra text accompanying notes 15-17, are applica-
ble to the Act. The territorial theory is inapplicable because the Act applies to crimes
committed outside the United States. See supra note 51. The protective theory is inap-
plicable because terrorists most often threaten the territorial integrity of states other
than the United States, even though they attempt to use United States citizens as a
means to their goal. The nationality theory is inapplicable because the Act applies to
any person who commits a terrorist act, not just United States nationals. Id.
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By utilizing international terrorism as its focal point,83 the Act
arguably asserts jurisdiction based upon the universal theory.
Under this view, the statute justifies the expansion of extraterritorial
jurisdiction by implying that international terrorism deserves treat-
ment as a crime of worldwide magnitude.8 4
The statute also asserts jurisdiction under the passive personal-
ity principle by proscribing terrorist acts solely because they injure
United States nationals. 85 Although the passive personality princi-
ple allows the United States to assert jurisdiction over foreign na-
tionals committing any criminal act that injures a United States
national, the Act's definition of international terrorism limits the
principle's application to a specified class of crimes. Although both
of these theories appear to lend theoretical support to the Act, the
passive personality principle is more appropriate than the universal
theory. The central problem with relying upon the universal theory
revolves around the difficulty in adequately defining terrorism.
A. The Universal Theory
The Act should have a solid basis in customary principles of
jurisdiction because it will have widespread impact on international
relations. 86 Although a state may believe that the exercise of univer-
sal jurisdiction is appropriate in a particular situation, universal ju-
risdiction, by definition, requires an international consensus that the
crime is so heinous that any nation obtaining control over the of-
fender ought to assert jurisdiction.8 7
Although many nations condemn terrorism,8 8 never will a sig-
nificant number of states reach such a consensus on a satisfactory
definition of the term.89 The United States government would
83 See supra note 57.
84 See CONF. REP., supra note 56, at 86 ("[T]he sense of the Senate [is] that the
President should call for international negotiations for the purpose of agreeing on a
definition of international terrorist crimes, and whether such crimes would constitute
universal crimes under international law."), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 1959.
85 See supra note 51.
86 Asserting jurisdiction based on the passive personality principle is certain to
cause havoc regarding the question of extradition. When one state seeks extradition
from another state on the basis of a questionable theory ofjurisdiction, disputes are sure
to arise. See Blakesley, supra note 22, at 716.
87 As Professor Paust points out, universal jurisdiction is technically jurisdiction to
enforce, and this enforcement is made on behalf of the world community. Paust, supra
note 3, at 211; see supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
88 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at A10, col. 4 (U.N. Security Council con-
demns hijacking of Achille Lauro cruise ship); N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1985, at A8, col. 1
(European leaders take steps to coordinate efforts to fight terrorism in Europe).
89 See Blakesley, supra note 22, at 716. Not surprisingly, commentators disagree on
whether the universal theory embraces terrorism. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 34 (1965) (recognizing only piracy as
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probably argue that the fundamental distinction between ordinary
crime and terrorism is that crime is motivated by self-interest and
terrorism seeks, through violent acts aimed at civilians, to effect
political change.90 In contrast, governments that are politically sym-
pathetic to the perpetrators of such acts would label those actors as
national heroes. As long as ideological differences exist, nations will
remain unable to agree on who is and who is not a terrorist. Thus,
the difference between terrorists, criminals, and freedom fighters
will only depend upon where the accused is prosecuted. So long as
no useful, widely accepted definition of terrorism under interna-
tional law exists, the offense cannot fall within universal jurisdiction.
B. The Passive Personality Principle
The Act is justifiable under the passive personality principle be-
cause it asserts jurisdiction on the basis of harm caused to United
States nationals while abroad.91 The Act has ample precedent in
international law.92 Although the passive personality principle is
less solidly grounded in United States tradition, an American court
has rejected it only when not expressly authorized by Congress.
Therefore, the Act does not reverse prior United States policy.
In the past, the judiciary dismissed the passive personality prin-
ciple as incompatible with United States law. Those early courts,
however, did not confront the same issues that exist today, and their
holdings did not expressly reject the passive personality principle.93
Furthermore, early opinions emphasized that territoriality and na-
offense subject to universal jurisdiction); RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 15, § 404 (ex-
tending universal jurisdiction to include "slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft,
genocide, war crimes, and perhaps terrorism"); Blakesley, supra note 22, at 718-19 (Ter-
rorism has "not yet achieved sufficient intensity of interest to warrant recognition as [a]
true bas[i]s for universal jurisdiction .... ).
90 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
91 See supra note 51.
92 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
93 Authors have relied upon a number of cases as repudiating the passive personal-
ity principle. But none of these early cases stands for strict repudiation of the principle;
all were decided before the Harvard Research article announced that the passive person-
ality principle is an acceptable theory of jurisdiction under international law. See supra
text accompanying note 14.
In The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825), the Court held that the United
States must return only those slaves which Spanish plaintiffs could prove to be theirs.
ChiefJustice Marshall reasoned that "the Courts of no country execute the penal laws of
another." Id. at 123. The passive personality principle was not an issue. The Act does
not include a provision whereby United States courts execute the laws of another coun-
try; rather, under the passive personality principle the United States would apply United
States law.
In Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892), the Court addressed whether to give
effect to a New York penal statute in a Maryland court. Although the parties character-
ized the action as involving a question of extraterritorial jurisdiction in international law,
the case essentially concerned the full faith and credit clause. In addition, the Court
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tionality constituted the only valid bases for jurisdictions. 94
Beginning in the early 1960s, however, federal courts began to
recognize all of the principles of jurisdiction that the 1935 Harvard
Research article set out as valid bases for jurisdiction. In United States
v. Layton 95 the court exercised jurisdiction over the defendant, who
was accused of killing a United States congressman in Guyana.
Although the statutes involved did not explicitly authorize extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction, the court stated that "it is proper to infer such
an intent and to hold that extra-territorial jurisdiction is implicit in
the respective statutes." 96 The court found that four principles of
jurisdiction supported prosecution of the defendant, including the
passive personality principle. 97 Although jurisdiction was possible
without the principle, the court noted with approval that it "is cited
in the case law without any suggestion that it should not be relied
upon by the courts."98 Layton therefore supports the proposition
that courts can apply the passive personality principle even absent
specific congressional authorization. 99
One circuit court has expressly refused to apply the passive per-
sonality principle on its own volition. Despite its language, the
opinion in United States v. Columba-Colela, 100 offers no persuasive evi-
dence that Congress may not employ the principle if it so chooses.
The defendant, a Mexican, although pleading guilty at trial to sell-
ing a stolen American car while in Mexico, reserved the right to ap-
peal the jurisdictional issue. 101 On appeal the Fifth Circuit first
rejected any possible application of the territorial and protective
theories before looking to the passive personality principle for pos-
sible jurisdiction. In rejecting this principle the court stated:
used the word "penal" in a noncriminal sense. Thus, the case is authority neither for
nor against the passive personality principle.
The most persuasive of these early cases is United States v. Nord Deutscher Lloyd,
223 U.S. 512, 518 (1911), where the Court unequivocally stated that "the defendant
cannot be indicted here for what he did in a foreign country." The criminal statute
implicated, however, made no provision for extraterritorial application and sought to
protect European nationals rather than United States citizens.
94 See cases cited supra note 26.
95 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 973 (1981).
96 509 F. Supp. at 216.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 216 n.5.
99 Other cases assert that United States courts may exercise jurisdiction under any
of the five theories for jurisdiction, including the passive personality principle. See
United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 257 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110
(1983); United States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631, 635 (D.P.R. 1978); United States v.
Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 487 (S.D. Cal. 1960), aff'd in part sub nora. Rocha v. United
States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961).
100 604 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1979).
101 Id. at 358.
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[T]hat an act affects the citizen of a state is not a sufficient basis
for a state to assert jurisdiction over the act. It is difficult to dis-
tinguish the present case from one in which the defendant had
attempted not to fence a stolen car but instead to pick the pockets
of American tourists in Acapulco. No one would argue either that
Congress would be competent to prohibit such conduct or that
the courts of the United States would have jurisdiction to enforce
such a prohibition were the offender in their control. Indeed, Con-
gress would not be competent to attach criminal sanctions to the murder of an
American by a foreign national in a foreign country .. 0.. 2
The court cited no binding authority for these assertions. As
the principal authority for rejecting the passive personality princi-
ple, it relied upon the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States.103 But since 1979, the year of the Columba-Colella
decision, the American Law Institute has reconsidered its posi-
tion.' 0 4 While the language of the American Law Institute's most
recent draft would not permit jurisdiction based upon the particular
facts of Columba-Colella, 105 the draft does not support the Fifth Cir-
cuit's assertion that Congress is not competent to prohibit conduct
based on the passive personality principle.
The Columba-Coklea court also relied upon American Banana Co.
v. United Fruit Co. 106 and United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 10 7
both of which tangentially touched the passive personality issue in
the context of a civil suit.1 0 8 In American Banana, an Alabama corpo-
ration sued a New Jersey corporation alleging that the Sherman Act
governs torts committed in Panama.1 9 In holding that the Sherman
Act does not govern, the Court presumed that " 'all legislation is
primafacie territorial.' "110 The decision, however, rested on a con-
struction of the Sherman Act, not thepower of Congress to prescribe
102 Id. at 360 (emphasis added).
103 Id.
104 RESTATEMENT DRAFTr, supra note 12, § 402 comment g; see supra note 44.
105 See 604 F.2d at 356.
106 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
107 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
108 The court relied on the language in American Banana which reads that "the fore-
going considerations would lead in case of doubt to a construction of any statute as in-
tended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the
lawmaker has general and legitimate power." American Banana, 213 U.S. at 357 (empha-
sis added), cited with approval in Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d at 360. The court's reliance on
the language in American Banana raises doubt as to whether the principal basis of that
decision was Congress's intent or a rejection of the passive personality principle. Simi-
larly, the court relied on the statement in Aluminum Co. of America that "[w]e should not
impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has
no consequences within the United States." Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 443
(emphasis added), cited with approval in Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d at 360.
109 213 U.S. at 357.
110 Id. (quoting Ex parte Blain, 12 Ch. D. 522, 528 (1879)).
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rules of conduct for acts committed abroad.1' I Congress clearly in-
tends that the Antiterrorist Act, unlike the Sherman Act, apply ex-
traterritorially. 1" 2 In Aluminum Co. of America the Second Circuit
upheld the dismissal of a complaint which alleged a conspiracy to
restrain foreign and interstate commerce in violation of the Sher-
man Act. 31 3 The court relied upon congressional intent in holding
that the Sherman Act does not attach liability for conduct outside
the United States. 114 Thus, in neither American Banana nor Aluminum
Co. of America did the judiciary challenge the power of Congress to
attach criminal liability for acts committed abroad.
Nor did the Columba-Colella court evince any constitutional basis
for rejecting the passive personality principle. Ultimately, the court
simply stated that Congress did not intend to assert jurisdiction
over foreign nationals who knowingly received vehicles in foreign
countries that were stolen in the United States. 115 The court's
broad language suggesting that Congress cannot assert jurisdiction
based on the passive personality principle1 16 is not supportable in
light of Congress's constitutional powers."17 The case can only
mean that a court should not exercise this type ofjurisdiction absent
clear congressional authorization. Nevertheless, no decisions have
emerged which contradict the language of Columba-Colella, partially
because courts have avoided the passive personality principle where
possible and have stretched other more widely accepted theories to
meet the needs of the case at bar. 1 8
IV
PROPOSAL FOR LIMITED EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
BASED ON THE PASSIVE PERSONALITY PRINCIPLE
The Act represents a worthy extension of United States juris-
diction over international crimes pursuant to the passive personality
principle. The statute, however, raises difficulties for the United
States in the conduct of its foreign policy."19
111 Id. ("In the case of the present statute the improbability of the United States
attempting to make acts done in Panama or Costa Rica criminal is obvious .... We
think it entirely plain that what the defendant did in Panama or Costa Rica is not within
the scope of the statue so far as the present suit is concerned.").
112 See supra note 51.
113 148 F.2d at 422.
114 Id. at 443.
115 604 F.2d at 358.
116 Id. at 360.
117 See supra notes 59-81 and accompanying text.
118 See Comment, supra note 60, at 293.
119 Perhaps the Act's most disturbing aspect is no indication in its legislative history
that Congress pondered or debated the foreign policy implications of this extension of
jurisdiction. See CONF. REP., supra note 56, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
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Unconditional adoption of the passive personality principle
may subject United States citizens to reciprocal treatment abroad.1 20
The United States cannot hope to prosecute foreign acts committed
against its citizens without subjecting United States citizens to simi-
lar prosecutions from foreign countries.' 21 Such treatment seems
particularly likely in nations sympathetic to what the United States
calls "terrorism."
Consequently, Congress must define and apply the passive per-
sonality principle narrowly to ensure that the United States cau-
tiously asserts such jurisdiction. As the Act stands, the United
States retains unfettered jurisdiction over foreign nationals commit-
ting acts of terrorism abroad against United States nationals.' 22
This jurisdiction is broader than necessary, and could cause hostility
toward United States nationals abroad. A more politically sound ap-
proach would temper the bill with strict self-imposed limits.
Congress should amend the Act to contain a provision asserting
United States jurisdiction only in cases where the state with primary
jurisdiction refuses or fails to prosecute the accused. 123 This lim-
ited jurisdiction comports with the reasonableness test employed by
the German (Federal Republic) Penal Code and the Italian Penal
Code. 124 This constraint would reduce conflicts involving concur-
rent jurisdiction for offenses which fall within the Act and a foreign
sovereign's laws. American jurisdiction over these offenses should
NEws at 1925; H.R. REP. No. 494, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1865; S. REP. No. 304, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); 132
CONG. REC. H1236-72 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1986), S6212-13 (daily ed. May 20, 1986),
S8403-20, 8435-40, 8458-59, 8470 (daily ed.June 25, 1986), S1 1,250 (daily ed. Aug. 11,
1986).
120 See Paust, "Nonprotected" Persons or Things, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM 395 app. at 395 (A. Evans &J. Murphy eds. 1978). In addition, Professor
Paust asserts, without citing support, that an act explicitly adopting the passive personal-
ity principle would be highly questionable under international law. Id.
121 Id.
122 See supra notes 51 & 57 and accompanying text.
123 [A]rticle 7 of the German (Federal Republic) Penal Code provides for
application to acts injuring German nationals if the acts are punishable in
the place they occurred or if no other authority takes jurisdiction; article
10 of the Italian Penal Code provides forjurisdiction over acts committed
by foreigners abroad that injure Italy or one of its citizens, when the of-
fense is punishable under Italian Law by perpetual hard labor or imrison-
ment [sic] for one year or more [and no other authority takes
jurisdiction].
Blakesley, supra note 22, at 714 n.91.
China, however, takes a different approach to the principle in article 9 of its criminal
code. That article adopts the passive personality principle, but provides that "an act
may be punished notwithstanding that a final decision has been rendered." The Chi-
nese approach thus does not eliminate the possibility of double jeopardy to the wrong-
doer. See Sarkar, supra note 20, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 20, at 66
n.78; Harvard Research, supra note 3, at 616 n.8.
124 STGB art. 7; C.P. art. 10; see supra note 123.
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remain secondary, for no legitimate reason exists to prosecute al-
leged offenders when other competent courts exercise jurisdiction
under the more traditional jurisdictional notions of territoriality and
nationality.
To complement this reasonableness test, Congress should
redefine "terrorism" to require a heightened state of mind. Under
the present definition an alleged offender need only appear to intend
any one or more of the crime's secondary consequences. 125 This
definition blurs the distinction between an ordinary crime commit-
ted against United States nationals abroad, and acts actually in-
tended by their perpetrators to have political effects beyond their
primary consequences. The statute should require the trier of
fact' 26 to conclude that the accused intended political consequences
beyond the primary effects of the crime, and not merely that the
crime appeared intended to achieve a secondary purpose.' 27 This re-
fined definition of terrorism would reduce the likelihood of arbitrary
or inappropriate applications of the Act.
By limiting the scope of jurisdiction based on the passive per-
sonality principle and redefining "international terrorism," the
United States can narrow the risk of unwarranted reciprocal applica-
tions of the passive personality principle. If nations were then to
follow a strict rule of reciprocity, foreign nations could subject
United States citizens to prosecution for acts wholly committed
outside the foreign nation's territory only under limited
circumstances.
CONCLUSION
The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of
1986 is a laudable attempt to deal with the problem of international
terrorism by establishing United States jurisdiction over terrorists.
The Act is both constitutional and justifiable under internationally
accepted notions of jurisdiction. Still, the statute's current form
sweeps too broadly to avoid important prudential concerns. If Con-
gress narrows its definition of "terrorism," and limits the Act's
scope to situations where the nation with primary jurisdiction re-
fuses to exercise it, the statute will stand as a reasonable attempt by
125 See supra note 56.
126 The trier of fact is better equipped to make this determination than the Attorney
General, who currently has that responsibility under the Act. See supra note 57 and ac-
companying text.
127 Id. Although requiring the ultimate trier of fact to find that the defendant in-
tended the political consequences of his act would limit application of the statute, the
definitional problem of terrorism in international law would remain unresolved. See
supra note 84.
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Congress to reconcile traditional notions of jurisdiction with the
emerging reality of international terrorism.
Patrick L. Donnelly
